Privatization of Military and Security Companies:A Threat and Risk Analysis to the Security of the Nigerian State

Abstract

The study on "Privatization of Military and Security Companies: A Threat and Risk Analysis" examines the involvement of PMCs in the proliferation of SALWs and their impact on the security of states in Africa, particularly Nigeria. The carnage caused by the atomic bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki during World War II drove the world to the threat of possible human extermination through weapons of mass destruction. Consequently, various organizations, particularly the United Nations, regional bodies, and non-state actors, have attempted to ensure global safety. To prevent and monitor the spread of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, the United Nations (UN) created the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on July 29, 1957. Since the end of the Cold War, however, it has become a sobering reality that SALWs, rather than WMDs, are responsible for the vast majority of casualties in internal conflicts worldwide. It is accurate to label SALWs as "weapons of mass destruction" due to the devastation they cause. This primary gap is what we aim to address with this research. The study employed a qualitative approach to data analysis, drawing from primary and secondary sources, including existing literature on the topic and related documents. Existing data on this subject revealed a potentially disastrous aspect of the spread of SALWs throughout sub-Saharan Africa and Nigeria in particular. Similarly, the research findings concluded that small arms and light weapons (SALWs) have never been subjected to any systematic, traceable transfer mechanism, nor have they been recognized as strategically important to global safety. This situation persisted until the end of the Cold War when asymmetric warfare in the world's weakest nations began to threaten state disintegration. The study concludes that numerous factors contribute to the widespread proliferation of SALWs in Nigeria, including but not limited to porous borders, activities of private military and security companies, rogue arms brokers, corruption, sales of arms to civilians by security operatives, and weak arms control mechanisms.