Prebendal Politics and National Development: A Perspective Relevant to Nigeria

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Abstract
This study examines the impact of Prebendal politics on national development in Nigeria. It explores the concept of prebendalism, coined by Richard A. Joseph, which describes the sense of entitlement many Nigerians feel towards the country's tax income. The research investigates the nature of Prebendal politics, national development, and the effect of Prebendal politics on national development in Nigeria. The study aims to provide a conceptual and theoretical appraisal of Prebendal politics and national development, highlighting the instability and incompatibility of prebendal practices with effective public services and democratic systems The paper recommends that proper political leadership with the neccesary political will should emerge at all levels It further recommends that political office holders mindsets must shift from the prebendal ideology to that of selflessness and patriotism.
Keywords: prebendalism, national development, political corruption, neopatrimonialism, patron-client politics.

Introduction

Richard A. Joseph, international political scientist, is typically credited for coining the political term "prebendalism" to refer to neopatrimonialism or patron-client relationships in Nigeria. The phrase since its coinage, has been widely used in academic scholarships and textbooks. A prebend is the "right of member of chapter to his share in the revenues of a cathedral," according to the Catholic Encyclopedia. Joseph coined the phrase to characterize the sense of entitlement that many Nigerians believe they have a right to the share of the country's tax income. Members of their own ethnic and religious groups, government employees, and elected politicians believe they should get a portion of government income. "State offices are viewed as prebends that can be appropriated by officeholders, who use them to generate material benefits for themselves and their constituents and kin groups," Joseph stated regarding the notion of patron-client politics. Nigeria has consistently placed among the least transparent countries by Transparency International in its Corruption Perceptions report due to that type of patron-client or identity politics.

Many Nigerians may not be familiar with the phrase, but they are aware of the behaviors and mindsets it describes, according to Oluwafemi. Understanding what a prebend is essential to comprehending patron-client dynamics. The ability of the office holder to appropriate the office-that is, turn it into their portion of the state—marks the boundary. Resources that accrue to the office can be redirected for personal and related purposes or for the capital accumulation that it enables, although this is only possible in modern Nigeria and other periphery capitalist nations. Thus, the definition of "the prebendalization of the patrimonial state" in the Wikipedia passage is appropriate. Nigerian politics are not always patron-client politics.

It is deeply ingrained and widespread in a nation; and how prebendal ideas were incorporated into what Ken Post and Michael Vickers had previously referred to as a "conglomerate society,"

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which is a country made up of cultural segments based on ethnicity, language, geography, and customs. A dynamic system that connected the allocation of governmental positions in Nigeria to the material well-being of the populace was characterized by patron-client procedures.What happens to the state itself is a crucial factor. However, a prebendalized system is unstable by nature. Prebendal practices eventually thwart efforts to create a cohesive country, a democratic system, and a functional state.

Statement of problem

According to Ayobolu (2011), those in the second republic who held public offices at all levels believed they had the right to unrestricted access to public resources, which allowed them to meet both their own material demands and the needs or desires of subaltern customers. An unhealthy rivalry and competitiveness for public office that led to widespread instability was exacerbated by this type of unlawful diversion of public resources for self-serving private objectives, which also deprived the polity of funding for growth. In Nigeria, dysfunctional government has debilitating effects on every aspect of daily living and governance performance. The delivery of effective public services and patron-client relationships are fundamentally incompatible. Thus, this research intends to investigate prebendal politics and national development in Nigeria.

Research Questions
The following research questions are formulated to guide the study?
1 What is the nature and extent of prebendal politics in Nigeria.
2. What are the effects of Prebendal politics on national development in Nigeria.
3. How can Prebendal politics be addressed to promote good governance and democratic institutions in Nigeria.

Objectives of the Study

This study is aimed at accomplishing the following objectives, namely to:
i.   examine the nature and dynamics of prebendal politics in Nigeria
ii.   investigate the impact of Prebendal politics on national development in Nigeria.
iii.   identify strategies for addressing prebendal politics and promoting good governance and democratic institutions in Nigeria.

Hypotheses

Derived from the objectives of the study, the following hypotheses are formulated to guide the study:
H0: There is no significant relationship between prebendal politics and national development in Nigeria.
H1: Prebendal politics has a significant negative impact on good governance and democratic institutions in Nigeria.
H2: The higher the level of prebendal politics in Nigeria, the lower the level of national development.
H3: Prebendal politics is positively correlated with corruption nepotism and cronyism in Nigeria.

Literature Review
Political culture

At its core, political culture is the set of beliefs, values, and attitudes that support a given political system's functioning (Lain, 1996). Political culture is similarly defined by Beer (1974) and Hari (1997) as the shared attitudes or views toward political events and objects as well as the generally recognized rules in the political game. Every country does, in fact, have a distinct political

culture that shapes how its citizens respond to and behave in response to political events, challenges, and advancements. Dahl (1967) contends that political culture has a significant role in understanding a range of political behavior and activity patterns.

Political socialization is the process by which a particular political culture is formed and preserved. According to Nwabuzor and Mueller (1986), Abonyi (2006), and Michael (2008), political socialization is essentially the process by which a political society passes on its political culture from one generation to the next. Individual members of a political community do in fact develop their political views via this process of learning (Ezeugwu and Okafor, 2011). Similarly, as Dahl (1967) argues above, Nigerians' pattern and style of political participation, the methods and tools used by political actors in electoral competition to secure victory, their views on obtaining and using political offices, and their assessments of political events and decisions are all largely explained by the country's political culture. In light of this, political culture serves as the foundation for our debate and analysis.

Patron-Client Politics and the Conduct of Democratic Elections in Nigeria
Fundamentally, the practice and sustainability of consistent, reliable election procedures and conducts are essential to democratic growth. In actuality, holding credible, free, and fair elections is one of the fundamental components or defining characteristics of democratic practice. Therefore, the process of choosing the leaders of a democratic polity at any given time may be considered the central concern. This choice is made via election, which makes it a pivotal moment in the democratic process and a necessary way to give voice to the people's will, which is the foundation of governmental power. Mohammed (2007). Credible elections are, in fact, the center of ideal and sustainable democracy, and as such, they are intimately related to the expansion and advancement of democratic political order (Huntinghton, 1991). A free and fair election process to decide who will be permitted to occupy political office at any level and at any time is one of the sacred components of democracy, according to Ogundiya (2010). According to Egbo (2003) and Abonyi (2005), elections are the sole way to ensure the legitimacy and integrity of democratic practices.

Unfortunately, Nigerian elections have consistently been marked by widespread and severe electoral fraud and violence, making them devoid of the fundamental components of a democratic election. According to the corresponding research on Nigerian elections conducted by academics such as Dudley (1982), Ogundiya and Baba (2004), Egwu (2003), and Yakubu (1999), there is a significant amount of electoral fraud and violence throughout these elections. This is largely due to the fact that, in Nigeria, obtaining political office is no longer viewed as a chance to serve the people but rather as a way to achieve some kind of economic empowerment, a stable material existence, influence, and wealth. In fact, obtaining political office is seen less as a way to serve the public interest and more as a way to further one's own financial interests. Unhealthy rivalry and competitiveness for political position are undoubtedly heightened by this, which can lead to election tampering, violent clashes, and even coups. In fact, Nigeria's prebendal mindset makes it impossible to have free and fair elections, which undermines both the legitimacy and credibility of elections in particular and democratic practices in general (The Nation, 2003).

The "sit-tight" phenomenon and the manipulation of state institutions by incumbent political office holders in Nigeria to win elections and stay in power are largely explained by the prebendal mindset or orientation. Indeed, a Nigerian politician in government would undoubtedly try to cling onto their position for longer than is allowed by the constitution or without the backing of the voters. Unfortunately, the desire to maintain the privileges of the position is typically the driving force behind such undemocratic intention and endeavor. One classic example of this ambition and endeavor would be former President Olusegun Obasanjo's push for a third term. However, the political leaders of the State Independence Electoral Commission (SIEC) and the Independence Natural Electoral Commission (INEC), who view their positions as prebends, actively work with

avaricious and self-centered politicians to rig election laws, procedures, and processes in order to guarantee the victory of the "preferred party or candidates." Nigeria's democratic growth has been plagued by widespread electoral fraud (Tolu and Abe, 2011).

In general, and in keeping with Nigeria's prebendal approach to politics and political power, elections have turned into a do-or-die situation in which winning must be accomplished by all means necessary. Because of this, Nigerian elections are not conducted with the sportsmanlike attitude that requires the best to win and the loser to congratulate the winner at the conclusion of the match. In fact, candidates for political office would never want to lose in the majority of Nigerian elections, either within or between parties. As a consequence, political opponents must be severely insulted and threatened to withdraw from the race. This situation undoubtedly explains why violence is used so frequently in the country's political processes, which has serious ramifications for democracy and sound governance (Oke, 2011). According to Ogundiya (2012), this has notably resulted in poor leadership input over the years, along with its concomitant undemocratic and poor governance, reckless and unaccountable leadership, and stalling in the country's development and growth process.

In this regard as well, Egbo (2003:174) particularly argues that where legitimate candidates and patriots are intimidated and diverted to make room for clowns and narrow-minded kleptocrats whose conception of leadership and government does not extend beyond immediate self-indulgence, democracy cannot flourish.

Furthermore, political godfathers reserve the majority of electoral posts for "sale" at the intra-party level, and politicians who "buy" these positions inevitably foot the bill through the prebends of their positions. According to Akiniyi (2012), the political class becomes only responsible to itself and its funders in this situation as stewardship to political masters is valued more highly than to the people. Given that loyal political godsons often receive reelection while dissidents receive recall or loss in a later election, this attitude makes sense (John, 2012). Internal party democracy and the holding of democratic general elections are not supported by this. This is due to the fact that it is highly improbable that general inter-party elections would be held in a free and fair manner if candidates are not elected freely during intra-party elections (Eme et al., 2012).

Fundamementally, the question of ideology in governance and Democratic Party politics is pushed to the sidelines as a result of the fact that the primary goal of entering politics and gaining political power in Nigeria has changed to become prebendal in character. Ideology should ideally govern a political party's development goals, policies, programs, and activities as well as those of individual politicians (Abonyi, 2005). Nonetheless, in prebendal political environments, such as Nigeria, individuals assume power without a predetermined ideological foundation, making it challenging to lead with purpose and vision. This is due to the fact that a political leadership that does not have an ideology would undoubtedly lack discipline and development focus. It may also not be subject to the rule of law and may not feel obligated to keep any promises or commitments made during the campaign. According to Akin (2010) and Shola (2009), the government that is elected is typically not required to operate and provide the people with the benefits of democracy when political party allegiance and actions are not motivated by ideology. Indeed, political office holders require ideological guidance and motivation in order to truly serve the state and make sacrifices (Michael, 2008; Tatalo, 2013). A clear and distinct ideology, on the other hand, gives voters a clear idea of which party or candidate to support in an election. It also offers a clear standard and templates by which voters and the general public will ultimately evaluate the performance of political parties.

Once more, the people of Nigeria have developed a cynical and lukeworm attitude regarding elections and electoral conducts due to the widespread and apparent exhibition of prebendal attitudes by political office holders (Akin, 2010). In fact, the general public has grown skeptical and seems indifferent to electoral activities as they believe that holding office and using it would neither benefit

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them or improve their quality of life (Akinyi, 2012). The energy and dynamism that define democratic elections-which are often produced by widespread and active involvement in the electoral processes and conducts-are significantly diminished by this political indifference.

In general, attempts to advance appropriate democratic practices in Nigeria are impeded by politicians who take use of the state's resources to further their own agendas and enrich themselves. The intellectual underpinnings and core ethics of democratic elections and politics are, in fact, being ignored more and more in Nigeria's prebendal environment (Ogundiya, 2010; Omolulo, 2007).

Patron-Client Politics and Representative Democracy

At its core, a representative democracy is a form of governance in which the electorate or citizens are permitted to choose representatives to serve as their representatives in the legislature and to create and implement laws on their behalf (Nwatu, 2008). It is the antithesis of direct democracy, when all adult citizens actively and completely engage in their polity's government (Nwankwo, 1992). Today, representational democracy is practiced in the majority of nations worldwide. Since gaining independence, Nigeria has implemented representative democracy in an attempt to guarantee public participation in administration, even if it is only indirectly, and to improve grassroots and overall national development (Nwatu, 2008). Effective representative electoral democracy practices do, in fact, not only result in the delivery of democratic benefits but also in the development of social and political ties between the people and their representatives. In Nigeria, elected officials are essential to achieving the stated goals at the federal, state, and local levels of government. The President, Senators, and members of the House of Representatives are examples of those at the federal level. Governors and state legislators are at the state level, and chairmen and councilors are at the local government level.

Unfortunately, Nigerian political office holders' will and capacity to effectively represent the public have been severely hampered by patron-client politics. Representatives are typically thought of as devoted stewards of the democratic process and system, understanding their responsibility to carry out the will of the electorates they serve (Akin, 2010). In Nigeria, on the other hand, political officials have a more prebendal attitude toward holding office (John, 2012). According to Egbo (2003) and Oluchukwu (2012), Nigeria's elected lawmakers have not only abandoned their constitutional responsibilities to enact laws, but they have also turned the National Assembly, State Assemblies, and even the local government legislative council into marketplaces where the newest political stocks are traded for naira. This prebendal mindset is actually the complete opposite of an effective representative democracy since the representatives' primary focus now is on allocating state resources rather than effectively representing the electorate and providing citizens with the benefits of democracy.

Once more, the adoption of zoning as an electoral concept by Nigerian political parties to choose candidates for elected seats may be explained, to a considerable degree, by patron-client politics (Oke, 2011). In this regard, representative democracy in Nigeria has evolved to basically involve inviting or choosing individuals to come and partake in the national cake. Without a doubt, this approach does not impede any effective or productive representation. Indeed, it is incompatible with the growth and maintenance of a successful representative democracy. In actuality, the moral justification for holding a representative office is rendered inadmissible when it is utilized against the will of the people and solely to enrich the office holder.

When one considers the low level of development in Nigeria's rural areas, for example, and the fact that these areas have representatives at the federal, state, and local government levels who are meant to be addressing the development issues of these rural constituencies, it is easier to understand the case of poor political representation. However, it is observed that these representatives prioritize their own self-interests and break all of their pre-election pledges and

promises of effective representation. To the dismay of the impoverished people who elected them, they frequently, for example, build opulent structures, drive fancy automobiles, fly into their own impoverished rural constituencies in private jets, and accumulate enormous fortune. This prebendal mindset-driven mindset does not, in fact, reflect effective representation as it ought to in a perfect representative democracy. Furthermore, these officials' unquenchable desire to amass fortune not only obstructs efficient representation but also numbs voters' democratic senses, endangering the country's democratic consolidation. Patron-client politics in Nigeria, according to Ogundiya (2010), have actually undermined democracy's core ideals, including the need for a government that is representative, open, and answerable to the people. It is important to note that Nigeria has consistently been among the countries with the lowest political transparency rankings by Transparency International throughout the years.

National development

The Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English defines "national" as a phenomena that encompasses a whole country. Thus, national development may be defined as the whole progress or collective socio-economic, political, and religious growth of a nation. Development planning, which may be defined as the nation's set of plans outlined by the government, is the most effective way to do this.

National development plans in Nigeria

Nigeria has had a number of development strategies. Nigeria is always under attack from the ghost of progress. In fact, its 49 years of freedom are passing every day as it looks for progress. The nation's history is so deeply ingrained with the myth of growth and development that it is mistaken for the history of colonial-era growth patterns and techniques. Development has been the most dynamic phrase. According to Aremu (2003), this appears to be the only nation where almost every development concept and model has been tested.

The first National Development Plan policy was created between 1962 and 1968, two years after independence, with the goals of expanding access to opportunities for work, education, and health development, among other things. This strategy was unsuccessful because just 14% of the external funding that was required to fund it was obtained, although 50% of the resources were to come from outside sources (Ogwumike, 1995).

The plan was further upset by the fall of the first Republic and the start of the Civil War. The second national development plan, which ran from 1970 to 1974, was introduced during the civil war. Its main objectives were the following: agriculture, industry, transportation, manpower, defense, electricity, communication, water supply, and social services (Ogwumike, 1995). The third plan, which spanned 1975–1980, was thought to be more ambitious than the second. Rural development and initiatives to revitalize the agricultural sector were prioritized. The significance of health, social, and other services was acknowledged in the fourth plan, which ran from 1981 to 1985. Improvement of the people's living conditions was the goal of the strategy. The specific goals were to increase the average citizen's real income, distribute income more evenly among individuals and socioeconomic groups, increase reliance on the nation's human and material resources, and lower the unemployment and underemployment rates (Ogwumike, 1995). Nigeria's vast oil riches was not used during these times to establish a sustainable industrial basis for the nation or to start an agricultural revolution that would end widespread poverty. For example, the Green Revolution Program, which took the role of Operation Feed the Nation, was unable to produce enough food to feed everyone. The national economic empowerment and development strategy (NEEDS), Vision 2010, the structural adjustment program (SAP), the establishment of development centers, and other development plans have all been attempted recently with little to no success. There is presently no clear methodological strategy

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to fulfilling the seven points on the current administration's agenda with vision 2020. It is clear that the existing state of affairs does not reflect what growth implies.

The problems of national development in Nigeria

Despite a number of development plans implemented by succeeding administrations, often with the best of intentions, all efforts to produce significant development ultimately failed. In light of this, the following questions must be answered: "Were those earlier development plans or strategies poor in their context, or incorrectly projected?" Why, despite the abundance of resources available to us, is it still so hard to produce significant development if there was nothing wrong with the plans? The answers to these riddles are not implausible. Numerous forces have come together to impede the progress of the country. First, there is typically no executive capability in charge of creating and carrying out the strategy. Typically, we witness officials appointed to such a role but without any significant executive authority.

Public engagement was either little or nonexistent in some of the earlier development plans, which led to their failure. Even the peasants in the countryside are meant to be included in the planning process. Not even the people's local government representatives were contacted. Planning is not a structure that is just used by technocrats (Mimiko, 1998). National growth is also hampered by poor governance. Development is a fantasy in the absence of sound government. This is a product of the nation's poor leadership. The majority of our leaders don't seem to care about progress. "Decolonization allowed the crop of leaders that aligned with colonial power to take over Nigeria," says Mimiko (1998), summarizing the scenario. This made guaranteed that a neo-colonial economy would continue to exist even after political independence. Instead of eliminating the colonial state's oppressive apparatus, these politicians swiftly increased its authority after taking office. Importantly, they lack a development vision to go along with the effective repression tool they inherited. They didn't care about progress; all they wanted was access to privileges and power.

Another obstacle to progress is a high degree of corruption and lack of discipline. Instead of utilizing the state to represent the interests of its citizens, corrupt politicians have turned Nigeria into a tool for wealth accumulation. It is difficult for a very excellent plan overseen by a very corrupt state to perform well (Mimiko, 1998). Since progress and corruption are mutually exclusive, they cannot coexist, and when one is present, the other suffers. The nation's monoeconomic foundation is another crucial element. To the disadvantage of other resources, the nation's survival is mostly dependent on crude oil. Every other area of the economy is disregarded. Nigerian agriculture, for example, which was the backbone of the country's economy in the 1950s and 1960s, has been placed in limbo over time. When there is hardly nothing to sell, how would the government support export promotion? The lack of economic diversity makes it unsuitable for sustainable growth (Mimiko, 1998).

Models of development: Asia in context

Many Asian nations have a reputation for having remarkable growth and development patterns. Only East Asia, driven by Japan and the rapidly industrializing economies of Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, and others, has been able to sustain robust, steady development patterns over a number of decades (Mimiko, 1998; Adelman, 1995). These civilizations' emergence was caused by a number of causes in addition to their homogeneous nature. These included the growth of the agricultural sector, a mass education system, the development of indigenous industries, an export-oriented approach, the Spartan discipline of their leadership, the existence of an effective bureaucracy, the development of Lawal and Oluwatoyin human resources, the promotion of a vibrant private sector that collaborates with the government to achieve a society-wide development vision,

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the building of institutional capacity, and attention to issues of governance, consistency, and policy stability, among other things (Mimiko, 1998).

Patron-Client Politics and National Development

Every civilization, organization, or community aspires to and craves development as a social phenomenon. The idea essentially encompasses all efforts to enhance human living situations in all of its manifestations (Gboyega, 2003). This means that national development means that a nation can raise the standard of living for its people by, for example, providing basic social and institutional infrastructures like good roads, electricity, affordable and functional health and educational facilities, and security services. According to Tolu and Abe (2011), national development is, in fact, the total growth or collective social, economic, political, and religious advancement of a nation.

In this way, national development encompasses social and political issues in addition to economic ones. In actuality, development need to permeate every facet of society. Sadly, despite the importance and necessity of national development, Nigeria has not made much progress in this area since gaining independence. The fact that poverty, unemployment, and malnutrition still exist in many parts of the country is proof of its low level of development. Despite the abundance of natural, human, and material resources in the nation, this is still the case. Patron-client politics may have played a significant role in the nation's failure to make significant progress in recent years. In Nigeria's patron-client political environment, political office holders and candidates view their positions primarily as a way to enjoy the national cake rather than as a chance to serve and advance the country (Egbo, 2003). This full-scale prebendal politics has had numerous and extraordinary repercussions on Nigeria's growth. In general, the consequences of Nigerian patron-client politics are seen in the country's near-complete lack of discernible social and economic advancement since gaining independence. Political office holders have, in fact, lost a great deal of awareness that the power of the office they hold truly belongs to the people and should be used for their benefit and to manage national development since it has become largely perceived as a prebend.

Patron-client politics, in particular, have detrimental effects on the formulation and execution of public policy when monetary advantages, kickbacks, and bribes take precedence over all other factors. The distributional effects of public policies are typically the intended outcomes of the political office holders' private interests, which have played a significant role in their creation, approval, and execution (Mala, 2010). Indeed, Nigeria's pervasive prebendal culture has created a scenario where the self-interest of state political leaders is prioritized over the welfare and interest of the populace in the activities and processes involved in policymaking and execution.

Once more, for prebendal grounds, policy consistency and stability are discouraged. In essence, Nigerian political leaders don't improve upon current policies. Instead, they would rather replace them with new ones for the purposes of party politics and self-aggrandizement. Additionally, patron-client politics and the corrupt practices that go along with it cause funds to be diverted from initiatives that are essential to social, economic, and poverty alleviation. In actuality, Nigeria's patron-client politics have led to a decline in the quantity and quality of goods and services that Nigerians can access, which is reflected in the country's appallingly low standard of living due to waste and a misalignment of priorities when it comes to public spending (Emma et al., 2012). In fact, as Omololu (2007) points out, political gladiators continuously use the populace, political positions, and political procedures to further their own self-serving goals, while the rest of Nigerian society is left in poverty and its citizens are living in extreme poverty.

In summary, the aforementioned suggests that patron-client politics and growth are, in fact, mutually exclusive. Since the two cannot live together, one definitely suffers while the other is there. Perhaps in light of this, Ilusoya (2009) argues vehemently that any effort to comprehend Nigeria's development and democratic challenges must address the issue of patron-client politics and the

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corruption that goes along with it, which is typified by outrageous waste, poor management, and the theft of limited national resources. Indeed, democracy and development cannot but remain empty rhetoric in the face of Nigeria's heedless quest to amass private riches via the use of governmental authority.

Research Methodology

For this study, a descriptive survey design is the recommended research design. The survey's topics included national growth and Nigerian patron-client politics. The researcher use descriptive statistics to efficiently carry out a legitimate analysis in the presentation and analysis of the data gathered in the field. Journals, magazines, newspapers, and other sources provided the secondary data, while structured interviews were used to gather the primary data. Academic employees of Lagos State University (LASU) and the University of Lagos (UniLag) comprised the study's target demographic. The study was conducted using a questionnaire and an interview. The respondents were chosen from four departments: public administration, religious studies, history and international studies, and political science. A basic random sample technique was employed to choose the target respondents from the public, and 73 respondents in total were interviewed.

The material we gathered came via library research, where the researcher reads, writes, and compiles relevant facts about the project's subject. The researcher attempts to draw conclusions after gathering data on the primary issue under investigation from relevant sources, including books, scientific journals, international legal instruments, and others. The researcher used qualitative prescriptive analysis in this study, which involves analyzing, interpreting, or discussing the subject matter in light of pertinent prior research.

Data Presentation and Analysis

The structured interview was sequentially analyzed and presented in Tables bar chart and Pie charts. However, all the necessary data with respect to respondent's responses were analyzed using coded ranking and percentage frequency method.

Table 4.1: Does patron-client politics influence development of Nigeria

Respondents	Frequency (F)	Percentage (%)
Yes	52	71.2%
No	15	20.5%
No response	6	8.3%
Total	**73**	**100%**

Sources: Field Survey, January 2019

The above table 1, shows that 55(72.4%) respondents yes, 15(19.7%) respondents, No, and 6(7.9%) No comments. Base on the table 1 & figure A, it implies that patron-client politics hampered the development of Nigeria. This corroborated with the view of Joseph et. al (2014), who observes that patron-client politics poses a great threat to democratic dividend and to socio-economic development and stability of good governance in Nigeria.

Table 4.2: **Could patron-client politics be responsible for Poor Democratic Institution in Nigeria**

Respondents	Frequency (F)	Percentage (%)
Yes	60	82.2
No	9	12.3
No Response	4	5.5
Total	**73**	**100**

Sources: Field Survey, January 2019

The above Table 2, shows that 60(82.2%) responds Yes, 9(12.3%) responds No and 4(5.5%) respondents No responses. Based on the analysis in Table 2 and Figure B, it implies that patron-client politics is responsible for poor Democratic Institution in Nigeria. Chukwuemeka, (2012) added that, the privilege of electing people of their choice to govern that was derived from the country using as the reference study, given the situation in which godfathers fostered candidates of their preference on the generality of the people.

4.3 Test for Hypothesis
Hypothesis one
Table 4.7: t-test Statistics for respondents' opinion

GROUP	N	X	SD	DF	α	t-cal	t-crit	P	Decision
Yes.	43	63.3750	14.06886	198	0.05	3.970	1.96	0.000	Rejected
No	30	33.0000	12.34130						

Table 4.7 showed a significant difference in the response of individuals on the level of national development in Nigeria. The mean scores are 63.3750 and 33.0000, tcal = 3.790 and t-crit = 1.96 which is less than the alpha (a) of 0.05. Therefore, the hypothesis which states that the level of national development in Nigeria is not low is rejected.

Hypothesis two
Table 4.8: t-test Statistics for difference in response

GROUP	N	X	SD	DF	α	t-cal	t-crit	P	Decision
Yes.	43	58.0000	19.51290	198	0.05	2.76	1.96	0.000	Rejected
No	30	37.6250	15.09797						

Table 4.8 showed a significant difference in the response of individuals on the level of patron client politics in Nigeria. The mean scores are 58.0000 and 37.6250, t-cal = 2.766 and t-crit = 1.96 which is less than the alpha (a) of 0.05. Therefore, the hypothesis which states that the level of patron-client politics in Nigeria is not low is rejected.

Hypothesis three
Table 4.5: t-test Statistics for difference in response

Group	N	X	SD	DF	α	t-cal	t-crit	p	Decision
Yes.	35	25.7688	12.35546	198	0.05	7.515	1.96	0. 000	Rejected
No	38	22.6573	10.87935						

Table 4.5 showed difference in response of respondents on the effect of patron-client politics on national development in Nigeria. The mean scores are 25.7688 and 22.6573, t- cal = 7.515 and t-crit = 1.96 which is less than the alpha (a) value of 0.05. Therefore, the hypothesis which states that there is no effect of patron client politics on national development in Nigeria is rejected.

Research Findings
Patron-client politics in Nigeria have emerged as one of the biggest risks to the consolidation of democracy, according to the examination of the results produced by the two hypotheses. According

to the study, patron-client politics have impeded Nigeria's progress; funds allotted to these two states and councils are frequently mismanaged, and an absurd number of contracts are given to godfathers and other political associates under false pretenses out of fear of losing their positions (Oluloyo, 2014). To appease their godfather at the expense of the populace, some receive monthly stipend from the public coffers for unfinished work. According to the report, Godfather is partly to blame for Nigeria's subpar democratic institutions. The results are in line with the work of Akinola (2009), Korikye & Wonibowei (2011), and Attan, Audu, & Haruna (2014), who also noted that patron-client politics is founded on political surrogacy involving material and ethical aid, in which the godson is the main recipient and the godfather is the major donor. As a result, the masses are being undermined without any democratic dividend. In the meantime, Godfather has put Nigeria's fledgling democratic experience in jeopardy.

Recommendations and Conclusion

This paper concludes that if Nigeria's pervasive and deeply ingrained prebendal practice is not sufficiently addressed and regulated, it would be impossible to establish effective, durable, and proper democratic practice and national progress. Effectively achieving this control requires the following: One is that the proper political leaderships with the necessary political will emerge at all levels of Nigerian government and implement suitable and long-lasting reforms to address patron-client politics in the country objectively and forcefully. Second, Nigerian political office holders' mindset shifts from patron-client politics to the ideal and selfless practice of utilizing public offices to serve the people. By doing this, they should demonstrate their readiness to put the needs of the vast majority of citizens ahead of their own self-serving interests. In this instance, it is necessary to systematically reject and remove the culture that views political office as a prebend. Effective political socialization by government agencies such as the Ministry of Information or the National Orientation Agency could accomplish this, cultivating among Nigerians the proper attitude and orientation toward political official positions, which in turn could change, for the better, the average Nigerian's view of politics and public office.

In order to curb prebendal tendencies in Nigeria, the government must, above all, actively monitor the type of political culture the country is developing and the processes of political socialization, both overt and covert. In other words, the Nigerian government must foster and maintain the development of public sentiments and values that are consistent with representative democracy and that would promote good governance. This is crucial because political culture is the foundation of political development.

The fourth is that the checks and balances principle has to be enforced. Because each branch of government has been given distinct responsibilities in accordance with the separation of powers principles, checks and balances emphasize one branch acting as a watchdog over the other. Naturally, the desire and actual use of public office for self-serving personal or group interests are moderated by the presence of institutional checks and balances. Indeed, since power corrupts and absolute power corrupts totally, the principle must be followed.

Five and lastly, Nigeria requires leaderships at the federal, state and local government tiers with obvious character of selflessness, discipline, honesty, personal sacrifice and excellent public and even private lives. This is crucial as such leaderships would be less likely to approach perceiving and exploiting public posts as prebends

The aforementioned research and discussion demonstrate how patron-client politics have significantly limited and impeded Nigeria's progress toward perfect democracy throughout the years. In fact, the interests and welfare of the vast majority of Nigerians are not being greatly advanced by the state's offices and institutions. Instead, they are being used and used more and more for selfish

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and other naive purposes. This implies that as long as patron-client politics persists and is not curbed, Nigeria will struggle to achieve any significant economic and sociopolitical improvement.

Political socialization involves sustaining the prebendal culture and practices that have been shown to be at the heart of Nigeria's socioeconomic and democratic underdevelopment issues. In this instance, the general sustainable democratization, national progress, and development process are being negatively impacted by Nigerians' continued education, acquisition, and growing prebendal orientation, attitude, and dispositions.

Controlling the prebendal practice, entails a determined and systematic efforts involving, cardinally, socializing Nigerians into understanding and seeing public offices and their occupation as an opportunity to render selfless, honest and transparent services for the advancement of the nation's welfare and development. This needs to be if proper democratic practice and meaningful national development is to be realized in Nigeria. Indeed, the more Nigeria continues to pay lip service to the control of patron-client politics, the more it flourishes to the detriment of proper democratic practice and national development.

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